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CAN A PUBLIc FIGURE WIN A LIBEL SUIT WHEN THE MEDIA
REPORTED THE TRUTH?-DEFAMATION AND FALSE
IMPRESSIONS
I. INTRODUCTION
The media relies on the truth as a complete defense against defamation
suits.' In a growing number of cases, however, public figures2 are not
suing the news media for false statements; rather, they are suing for false
impressions.3 The courts are divided on whether they can impose liabil-
ity on the news media for defamation by implication based on a false
impression without contravening the first amendment.' The convoluted
nature of defamation law, and the lack of clear and concise rulings con-
cerning defamation by implication,5 create uncertainty about whether
1. The common law rule, prior to 1964, stated that truth is an affirmative defense to a defama-
tion action. See W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON, & R. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON
TORTS 839 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON].
In 1964, the Supreme Court, in New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), created a
constitutional privilege, based on the first amendment privileges of freedom of the press and speech,
that defeats a party's ability to recover for defamation against members of the mass media for dis-
seminating information to the general public. When the challenged statements are true, many juris-
dictions decline to allow a public official to prove falsity by implication or libel by innuendo. See,
e.g., Pietrafeso v. D.P.I., Inc., 757 P.2d 1113, 1115-16 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988); Cibenko v. Worth
Publishers, Inc., 510 F. Supp. 761, 765 (D.N.J. 1981); Strada v. Connecticut Newspapers, Inc., 193
Conn. 313, 477 A.2d 1005, 1012 (1984); Schaefer v. Lynch, 406 So. 2d 185, 188 (La. 1981). See also
infra note 11 and accompanying text for a discussion of jurisdictions permitting a public figure to
prove falsity by implication.
2. See infra notes 19-21 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 29-68 and accompanying text. The scope of this Recent Development is
limited to a discussion of a mass media defendant's public figure defamation by implication. How-
ever, because a "false statement" is an element of the general tort of defamation, whether brought by
a public or private figure, court rulings regarding the falsity prong of the test for private figure
defamation are relevant to the decision of whether a cause of action exists. For a general discussion
of private figure defamation claims, see Katz, First Amendment-Defamation-Private Individual
May Recover Presumed and Punitive Damages Without a Showing of Actual Malice-Dun & Brad-
street, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 16 SETON HALL 785 (1986); Comment, Defamation and
Employment Relationships: The New Meanings of Private Speech, Publication, and Privilege, 28 EM-
ORY L.J 871 (1989); Comment, Defamation Law-Libel and Slander-Private Individual Required
to Show Actual Malice to Prove Defamation Where Topic of Speech is of Genuine Public Concern-
Sisler v. Gannett Co., 19 RUTGERS L.J. 157 (1987).
4. See infra notes 30-42 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 6-18 and accompanying text. Defamation law has become subdivided into
numerous categories. For example, different standards apply depending upon whether the plaintiff is
a public or private figure, whether the defendant may invoke privilege, whether the matter is private
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public figures will be able to overcome a media defendant's first amend-
ment right to freedom of expression.
II. DEFAMATION BY IMPLICATION
The court in a defamation by implication cause of action must deter-
mine whether the media statements, though not individually defamatory,
are capable of creating a defamatory impression.' Defamation by defini-
tion involves expression that injures reputation. Defamation by implica-
or public, and whether the statement is fact or opinion. See generally PROSSER & KEETON, supra
note 1, at 113-16.
One common misunderstanding regarding defamation pertains to the faulty analogy drawn to the
tort of false light. The tort of false light invasion of privacy arises when a defendant communicates
something factually untrue about an individual or when the communication carries a false implica-
tion. To be actionable, the falsehood must be "material and substantial" and achieve widespread
publicity. Though similarities exist between defamation and false light, false light is not an analyti-
cal subspecies of defamation. Furthermore, false light invasion of privacy encompasses a broader
class of speech than defamation. In addition, plaintiffs may establish false light claims on the basis of
injured feelings whereas defamation by definition applies only to reputational injury. Finally, false
light limitations consist only of the requirements of substantiality and vagueness. For a general
discussion of the tort of false light invasion of privacy, see Zimmerman, False Light Invasion of
Privacy: The Light that Failed, 64 N.Y.U. L. REv. 364 (1989); PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1,
at 773-78, 863-66.
6. The presiding court in a defamation action bears the responsibility for determining the
statement's capability to convey a defamatory meaning. White v. Fraternal Order of Police, 909
F.2d 512, 518 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Southern Air Transport, Inc., v. American Broadcasting Cos., 877
F.2d 1010, 1013-15 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
7. Four elements for a cause of action in defamation are:
1. a false and defamatory statement concerning another;
2. an unprivileged publication to a third party;
3. fault amounting at least to negligence on the part of the publisher; and
4. either actionability of the statement irrespective of special harm or the existence of
special harm caused by the publication.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 558 (1977).
Some states define "defamatory" as simply tending to injure reputation. See, e.g., Robertson v.
McCloskey, 666 F. Supp. 241, 247 (D.D.C. 1987); Burns v. McGraw-Hill Broadcasting Co., 659
P.2d 1351, 1357 (Colo. 1983) (en bane); Byars v. Kolodziej, 48 I11. App. 3d 1015, 363 N.E.2d 628,
630 (1977); Denny v. Mertz, 84 Wis. 2d 654, 267 N.W.2d 304, 308 (1978), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 883
(1982).
Others adopt specific, stated criteria. See, eg., Kimmerle v. New York Evening Journal, Inc., 262
N.Y. 99, 186 N.E. 217, 218 (1933) (defines defamation as "words which tend to expose one to public
hatred, shame, obloquy, contumely, odium, contempt, ridicule, aversion, ostracism, degradation or
disgrace, or to induce an evil opinion of one in the minds of right-thinking persons, and to deprive
one of their confidence and friendly intercourse in society"). New York courts have added to this
definition that which "tends to disparage a person in the way of his office, profession or trade." See
Coughlin v. Westinghouse Broadcasting & Cable, Inc., 603 F. Supp. 377, 384 (E.D. Pa. 1985); Held
v. Pokorney, 583 F. Supp. 1038, 1041-42 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Corabi v. Curtis Publishing Co., 441 Pa.
432, 442, 273 A.2d 899. 904 (1971) (quoting RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 559 (1938)) (communica-
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tion stems not from what the media literally stated, but from what the
statements imply.' The court cannot manufacture an implied defama-
tory meaning from words not capable of sustaining such meaning.9
To determine the meaning of an implied defamatory statement"° the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit ap-
plies a general test: whether the recipient reasonably understood the
statement as intentionally defamatory."1 Application of this general
standard becomes convoluted when the media report materially accurate
facts concerning a public figure. Though truth often protects a media
defendant from liability,' 2 a defendant that juxtaposes a series of facts to
imply a defamatory connection between them or creates a defamatory
implication by omitting certain facts, may face liability for defamation by
tion is defamatory if it tends to so harm the reputation of another so as to lower him in the estima-
tion of the community or to deter third persons from associating or dealing with him); Nichols v.
Item Publishers, Inc., 309 N.Y. 596, 132 N.E.2d 860, 862 (1956). See also Gallagher v. Johnson,
188 Mont. 117, 611 P.2d 613, 615 (1980) (defamation is a statement that "exposes any person to
hatred, contempt, ridicule, or obloquy or which causes him to be shunned or avoided or which has a
tendency to injure him in his occupation"). See generally Post, The Social Foundations of Defama-
tion Law: Reputation and the Constitution, 74 CALIF. L. REv. 691 (1986).
Still other courts abandon the search for a comprehensive definition and decide each case on its
own facts. See, eg., Beamer v. Nishiki, 66 Haw. 582, 670 P.2d 1264 (1983) (whether a statement is
defamatory "depends, among other factors, upon the temper of the times .... with the result that
words harmless in one age, in one community, may be highly damaging to reputation at another
time or in a different place"); Galvin v. Gallagher, 81 111. App. 3d 926, 401 N.E.2d 1243 (1980);
Newell v. Field Enters., Inc., 91 111. App. 3d 735, 415 N.E.2d 434 (1980).
8. See Tavoulareas v. Piro, 817 F.2d 762, 780 (1987) (en banc), cert denied, 484 U.S. 870
(1987); See generally R. SMOLLA, LAW OF DEFAMATION 4.05 (1990).
The Eighth Circuit does not recognize defamation by implication against a public figure. See
Price v. Viking Penguin, Inc., 881 F.2d 1426, 1432 (8th Cir. 1989) (citing Janklow v. Newsweek, 788
F.2d 1300, 1304 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 883 (1986)). Accord Fudge v. Penthouse Int'l,
Ltd., 840 F.2d 1012, 1016-17 (1st Cir.), cert denied, 488 U.S. 821 (1988).
9. White v. Fraternal Order of Police, 909 F.2d 512, 519 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
10. The meaning of a communication is the meaning the recipient, correctly or mistakenly,
reasonably understood the statement to express. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) ToRS § 563 (1977). To
determine whether a cause of action for defamation by implication exists, the language used, as a
matter of law, must convey a defamatory meaning, and the jury must find that the recipient actually
understood the language in that sense. If the recipient's defamatory interpretation is reasonable, it is
irrelevant that the defendant did not intend to convey a defamatory meaning. Intent, however, is
very relevant in establishing the specific elements of defamation by implication of a public figure
because the tort requires a showing of actual malice.
11. White, 909 F.2d at 518. See F. HARPER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 5.4 (1986). The Eighth
Circuit rejects this approach. See Janklow v. Newsweek, Inc., 788 F.2d 1300 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
499 U.S. 883 (1986) (illustrating the severe limitations of defamation by implication regarding mate-
nally true reports).
12. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
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implication. 3
The media defendant's affirmative conduct provides the tortious ele-
ment creating defamation by implication.1 4 For example, if a communi-
cation, viewed in its entirety, merely conveys materially true facts from
which the plaintiff reasonably can draw defamatory inferences, no libel
exists.15 However, if by the particular manner or language by which the
media defendant conveys the true facts, the communication supplies ad-
ditional, affirmative evidence16 suggesting that the media defendant in-
tended or endorsed the defamatory inference, the communication
13. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, at 839.
The rule that makes truth relevant to the "gist" or "sting" of the publication protects the
defendant who has got the details wrong but the "gist" right; but it also works in reverse,
to impose liability upon the defendant who has the details right but the "gist" wrong.
Thus, if the defendant juxtaposes a series of facts so as to imply a defamatory connection
between them, or creates a defamatory implication by omitting facts, he may be held re-
sponsible for the defamatory implication, unless it qualifies as an opinion, even though the
particular facts are correct... [If the particular facts are artificially juxtaposed] the truth
of the particular facts provides no protection; if not, the truth is complete protection.
Id.
14. White, 909 F.2d at 520.
15. Id.
16. McBride v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 717 F.2d 1460 (D.C. Cir. 1983), illustrates
sufficient additional evidence. In McBride, the court held the true statement that a doctor received
$5000 a day for his expert testimony was capable of supporting an implied defamatory meaning.
The court found it possible to conclude that because the plaintiff's case was weak it required an
excessive payment to secure any doctor as an expert witness. Hence, the statement implied that the
expert sold his testimony. Id. at 1465. The court found that the implied defamatory meaning arose
not from the mere reporting of the $5000 per day rate, but from the juxtaposition of the $5000
payment with the fees the defendant normally pays such experts. The publication read: "These
expert witnesses included William McBride ... who was paid $5000 a day to testify in Orlando. In
contrast, Richardson-Merrell pays witnesses $250 to $500 a day, and the most it has ever paid is
$1000 a day." Id. at 1462.
In Southern Air Transport Inc., v. American Broadcasting Cos., 877 F.2d 1010 (D.C. Cir. 1989),
the court considered whether a factually accurate report, which stated that Southern Air used planes
owned by a South African cargo company to transport arms to a Central American Contra base, was
reasonably capable of conveying the defamatory implication that Southern Air maintained a partner-
ship with the South African government. The court analyzed whether the juxtaposition of visual
graphics and commentary could imply defamatory meaning, and concluded that nothing in the de-
fendant's specific treatment of Southern Air made it reasonable to impute a partnership between
Southern Air and the South African government. Id. at 1015-16.
Janklow v. Newsweek, Inc., 759 F.2d 644, 648-49, (8th Cir. 1985), rev'd on other grounds, 788
F.2d 1300 (8th Cir.) (en bane), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 883 (1986), demonstrates one court's limitation
on defamation by implication regarding materially true reports. The Eighth Circuit held that a
report of the true fact of a 14-year-old's rape allegation was not capable of bearing a defamatory
meaning that Janklow was actually guilty of the alleged rape, even though the report omitted the
facts that: (1) Janklow had passed a lie detector test; (2) the alleged victim was "untestable" because
of her emotional display during her polygraph exam; (3) the medical exam showed no signs of rape;
and (4) numerous federal authorities called the rape allegations unfounded.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol69/iss3/18
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becomes capable of bearing a defamatory meaning.17 It is immaterial
whether the media defendant actually intended or endorsed the defama-
tory inference. 8
III. CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENTS OF PUBLIC FIGURE
DEFAMATION
Separate and distinct from the doctrine of defamation by implication,
courts also developed defamation law concerning public figures. 19 In
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,20 the Supreme Court established the
constitutional rule that public figures21 cannot recover damages for defa-
17. White, 909 F.2d at 520. If, for example, in Southern Air Transport, the media had superim-
posed a "South Africa Connection" graphic over the footage of Southern Air's plane, sufficient af-
firmative evidence most likely would have existed to justify imputing the defamatory meaning that
Southern Air was in partnership with South Africa. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. Historically, the common law of defamation derived from a compelling societal interest
to prevent and redress attacks upon reputation. See Eaton, The American Law of Defamation
Through Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. and Beyond: An Analytical Primer, 61 VA. L. REv. 1349,
1351-52 (1975) (detailed discussion of the history of defamation law through 1975). As a result of
judicial sentiment reflecting extreme distaste for defamatory statements, particularly because of the
injured party's inability to control the defamatory statements of another, the law of defamation used
a severe strict liability standard. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, at 771-72.
Prior to 1964, the plaintiff needed to prove the statement "tends so to harm the reputation as to
lower him in the estimation of the community or to deter third persons from associating or dealing
with him." Id. at 774 (quoting the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 (1977)). The burden
of proving the statement's truth rested on the defendant. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, at 804.
However, the common law judges were aware of the competing interest of freedom of expression
and, as a result, developed privileges, both absolute and conditional, to protect free and open debate.
Eaton, supra, at 1360-63. The privileges fell into two categories: absolute immunity and qualified
immunity. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, at 815-39.
The trend of carving out specific strict liability privileges evidenced an effort to preserve the inter-
est of freedom of expression that remained outside the constitutional framework for many years.
Note, Protection of Reputation Versus Freedom of Expression: Striking a Manageable Comprise in
the Tort of Defamation, 63 S. CAL. L. REv. 433, 422 (1990).
20. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). Sullivan, the police commissioner of Montgomery, Alabama, brought
a libel suit against four Alabama clergymen and the New York Times. Id. at 256. The plaintiff
premised his allegations on two paragraphs in a full-page advertisement soliciting contributions for
the support of the black student movement, the struggle for blacks' right to vote, and for legal
defense of Martin Luthur King, Jr. d. at 256-57. The paragraphs contained minor inaccuracies
regarding the specific details of police conduct; the advertisement did not mention Sullivan by name.
Because of the strict standard by which the common law treats defamation, the jury returned a
verdict for the plaintiff of $500,000. Id. at 256. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded. Id. at
292.
21. The Sullivan holding applied to public-figure plaintiffs. However, in an effort to provide
greater freedom of speech, the Court extended application of the Sullivan test to more plaintiffs.
In 1967, the Supreme Court consolidated the opinions of Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S.
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mation without clear and convincing proof22 that the defendant made a
false statementz3 with actual malice.24 Actual malice requires the media
defendant to have made the statement "with knowledge that it was false
or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not."25 Further-
more, the Court in Sullivan mandated its power to make an independent
examination of the whole record.26 The Court found this high level of
scrutiny necessary to prevent intrusion on the first amendment right to
free expression.27 The Court asserted that it affords greater constitu-
tional protection to speech concerning public officials' conduct and other
matters of public concern, because of the "profound national commit-
130 (1967) and Associated Press v. Walker, 388 U.S. 130 (1967), and held that the distinctions
between the private sector and public sector were so blurred that the adoption of separate standards
of proof had no basis in law, logic, or first amendment policy. Id. at 163. The Court blended the
issue of who is a public figure with the issue of what is the public concern, and extended the Sullivan
test to include public officials and public figures. Id. at 164. See Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.,
403 U.S. 29 (1971) (plurality of the Court expanded Sullivan to apply to cases based on an allegedly
defamatory publication concerning a matter of public or general interest).
In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974), the Court held: for cases involving a public
figure or public official, the plaintiffbears the burden of proving actual malice. Id. at 343. The state
may define the appropriate level of liability for a publisher or broadcast defendants when the plaintiff
is not a public figure or official. Id. at 347. The plaintiff receives compensation only for actual
injuries unless the plaintiff alleges defendant's knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the
truth. Id. at 349.
For a general discussion of defamation of a private plaintiff, see supra note 3.
22. In Cruzan v. Missouri Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2853 (1990), the Supreme Court
noted that the "clear and convincing" standard of proof is a higher standard, reflecting a social
judgment about the importance of particular types of adjudication.
23. Under the traditional Sullivan test, the requirement for a false statement means that at least
some part of the statement is untrue. This Recent Development focuses on the possibility that true
statements juxtaposed to create a false impression satisfy Sullivan's falsity prong. Courts have not
clearly ruled on this possibility. See infra notes 29-52 and accompanying text.
24. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279-80. The actual malice standard is very difficult to satisfy. For
example, failure to edit words used to remove liability does not give rise to actual malice nor does
portraying public figures in a non-fiattering manner. For eases finding no actual malice, see Newton
v. National Broadcasting Co., 913 F.2d 652 (9th Cir. 1990); Diesen v. Hessburg, 455 N.W.2d 446
(Minn. 1990); Coughlin v. Westinghouse Broadcasting & Cable, Inc., 603 F. Supp. 377 (E.D. Pa.
1985); Dunlap v. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., 301 Pa. Super., 448 A.2d 6 (1982).
25. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279-80.
26. Id. at 285. The independent examination of the record is not equivalent to de novo review.
In de novo review, the reviewing court makes an original appraisal of all evidence to determine
whether or not the court should enter judgment for the plaintiff. Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of
United States, 466 U.S. 485, 514 n.31 (1984). In independent examination, review is limited to those
portions of the record pertaining to the actual malice determination. Id.
27. Sullivan, 367 U.S. at 285 (quoting Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 235 (1963)).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol69/iss3/18
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ment" to the principle of uninhibited debate on public issues. 28
IV. PROVING FALSITY BY FALSE IMPRESSION, NOT FALSE
STATEMENT
Once the court surpasses the threshold issue of whether a true state-
ment reasonably could convey a defamatory meaning, the public figure
must then demonstrate the falsity of the defamatory statement. A public
figure fulfills the falsity prong of the Sullivan test by demonstrating that
the statement was false, or that the omitted underlying facts, if reported,
would have negated the false implication. 29 Whether true statements
juxtaposed to create a false impression satisfies Sullivan's "false state-
ment" requirement is unclear.
In Dunlap v. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. , the Superior Court of
Pennsylvania broke away from the traditional interpretation31 of Sulli-
van's false statement requirement. In Dunlap, a police officer sued a
newspaper for defamation. The newspaper's headline read, "Wide Police
Corruption Revealed."' 2 Beneath the bold headline a smaller headline3
read, "Patrol Outside, Gambling Inside." 4 Two photographs appeared
below the caption; the larger of the two showed a man placing his hand
inside a marked" police car.3 6 The photograph caption read, "Sergeant's
Car 17B Stops Outside Known Gambling Location," while the title of
the article itself read, "We Watched Gambling Spot Until Policemen
Nabbed Us."3" The article expressed that Officer Dunlap was "more
28. Sullivan, 367 U.S. at 270. See also Rose v. Koch, 278 Minn. 235, 254, 154 N.W.2d 409,
423 (1967) (quoting Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 270).
29. Diesen v. Hessburg, 455 N.W.2d 446, 455 (Minn. 1990). See also White v. Fraternal Order
of Police, 909 F.2d 512, 521 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Memphis Publishing Co. v. Nichols, 569 S.W.2d 412,
420 (Tenn. 1978). The plaintiff also must meet the other elements of the Sullivan test. This Recent
Development addresses only the complexities surrounding the falsity prong of the test. See PROSSER
& KEETON, supra note 1, at 839.
30. 301 Pa. Super. 475, 448 A.2d 6 (1982).
31. The traditional interpretation of the Sullivan falsity prong requires falsity of the actual
statements. See supra note 23.
32. Dunlap, 301 Pa. Super. at 478, 448 A.2d at 8.
33. Two smaller headlines appeared immediately beneath the bold headline. The one on the
left read: "Patrol Outside, Gambling Inside," while the one on the right stated, "Hidden Cameras
Confirm Reports of Payoff System." Id.
34. Id.
35. The marking on the police car was "17B." Id.
36. Id.
37. The article began immediately beneath the photograph of car 17B. Id. The article dis-
1991] 1015
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than likely""8 the sergeant in the car.39
Though the facts in the article were true,' the court held that the
combination of the article, headlines, and photographs gave rise to a false
and defamatory inference that Dunlap accepted a bribe.4' Thus, the
court stated that the literal accuracy of the separate statements did not
render the communication true when the implication of the communica-
tion as a whole was false.42
Other courts hold false impressions sufficient to satisfy the falsity
prong of a defamation claim. For example, in Memphis Publishing Co. v.
cussed the two newspaper journalists' "stakeout." Id. In reference to the photographs, the article
stated:
1. The reporter arrived at the designated location at 4:00 p.m. and found the street empty
with the exception of luxury cars and one man pacing the street in front of the
rowhouse.
2. Later the reporters observed other men speaking with the single man before entering the
rowhouse.
3. At 5:47 p.m. car 17B arrived. The man who remained outside of the rowhouse walked
out into the street, leaned on the driver's side, and reached into the squad car through
an open window.
4. At 5:51 p.m. the car left.
Id.
38. After the incident, reporters called the station. The person who answered the phone re-
ported that Officer Dunlap drove car 17B. Id. at 8. Another reporter interviewed Officer Dunlap
that Monday. The reporter asked Officer Dunlap if he drove car 17B that day, and he responded,
"more than likely." The officer also identified the man leaning into the car as Vincent Wilezyk, the
town drunk. Id. at 9.
39. Id. at 8-9. Before reaching the issue of falsity, the court first considered the threshold issue
of whether the article reasonably could convey a defamatory meaning. Id. Agreeing with the lower
court, the superior court found that the article reasonably could convey the defamatory meaning
that Officer Dunlap took a bribe. Id. at 10.
40. The statements at issue were: "We called the 17th precinct police station and asked who
was driving car 17B that day and was [sic] told it was occupied by Sgt. Samuel Dunlap;" when
"asked if he was driving car 17B that day he said, 'more than likely."' Officer Dunlap acknowl-
edged that the statements "reported only the undisputed and true facts." Id. at 14.
41. Id. at 14-15. The officer did not say it was false for the article to discuss the existence of
police corruption and the connection of the officer in car 17B with that corruption. Rather, Officer
Dunlap argued only that he was not in the car at that time, making the article's implication false.
Id. at 15 n.10.
The court found that the proof of "truth" must go to the "sting" or "gist" of the defamatory
claim. The test is "whether the [alleged] libel as published would have a different effect on the mind
of the reader from that which the pleaded truth would have produced." Id. at 15 (quoting R. SACK,
LIBEL, SLANDER, AND RELATED PROBLEMS 50-51, 137-138 (1980)).
42. Though the court held that defamation by implication could exist, for a public figure to
prevail in any defamation action, the public figure must fulfill all of the Sullivan prongs, including
actual malice. Though the court believed a false inference existed, satisfying the falsity prong, the
court found no actual malice existed to sustain a cause of action. Id. at 16. To date, the Supreme
Court has not foreclosed the possibility of fulfilling the Sullivan false statement requirement with
juxtaposed true statements that create a false impression. It simply never has reached the issue.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol69/iss3/18
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Nichols,43 a private citizen alleged defamation by implication because the
media's article implied that she had an affair. If the media had reported
all of the facts, the defamatory impression would not have existed. The
court held that the defendants misplaced their reliance on the truth be-
cause the question was "whether libel as published would have a different
effect on the mind of the reader from which the pleaded truth would have
produced."" The court stated that the statements so distorted the truth
as to make the entire article false and defamatory.45
Similarly, in Evening News Association v. Locricchio,4 two developers
of the Pine Knob entertainment complex filed a libel suit against the De-
troit News. The suit involved eleven news articles between April 1977
and April 1979 concerning the owners' involvement in the development
and operation of their entertainment facility. The Detroit News reported
that the owners, Locricchio and Francell, had both business and personal
associations with convicted felons and identified organized crime figures.
The two men sued the newspaper for libel on the grounds that the article
created a false impression connecting them to organized crime.47 They
also asserted that the articles entitled "The Pine Knob Story" hindered
them from obtaining financing and ultimately they declared
bankruptcy. 4
8
The jury awarded Francell $3 million in damages, but the judge over-
ruled the jury award, stating that the series of articles was not libelous
due to insufficient proof that the newspaper's statements concerning
Francell were untrue.49 On appeal, the Michigan Court of Appeals
found that the articles created the false impression that linked Francell to
organized crime and questionable financial activities. Therefore, the
court held that the jury could find "defamation by implication" when it
considered the series of articles as a whole. Though Evening News Asso-
ciation and Memphis Publishing concern a private party, the courts' dis-
cussion of false impression is relevant to the tort of defamation by
implication in general, because any party must fulfill the false statement
requirement.
Conversely, Minnesota has generally denied plaintiffs the right to re-
43. 569 S.W.2d 412 (Tenn. 1978).
44. Id. at 420 (quoting Fleckenstein v. Friedman, 266 N.Y. 19, 23, 193 N.E. 537, 538 (1927)).
45. Memphis Publishing, 569 S.W.2d at 420.
46. 469 U.S. 1018 (1984).
47. Proprietary to United Press International, Aug. 25, 1983.
48. Proprietary to United Press International, Sept. 5, 1985.
49. More Michigan News Briefs, United Press International, Feb. 28, 1989.
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cover for defamation by implication. In Diesen v. Hessberg,50 the Minne-
sota Supreme Court reversed a lower court ruling following recovery for
defamation based on false impressions. The Minnesota Court of Appeals
chose to follow an analysis similar to that applied in Dunlap to determine
that libel by implication existed."1 In Diesen, a former county attorney
brought a libel action against a newspaper, alleging that the newspaper's
series concerning his treatment of battered women suits left the false im-
pression that he ineptly and leniently prosecuted domestic abuse cases.
The appellate court found the implication of one of the articles sub-
stantially false because the article omitted material facts.5 2 The court of
appeals found that the omission of facts left the reader with the impres-
sion that, even though the assailant severely assaulted the victim, Diesen
did not believe the action merited felony prosecution. The court found
for Diesen, holding that: the media omitted known facts creating a falseimpression; the record supported the finding of actual malice; and the
statement implying Diesen's malfeasance was not constitutionally
protected.53
The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed. The court concluded that
the omissions, considered in totality, had no material effect in changing
the thrust or tenor of the article. 54 The supreme court stated that the
organizing and editing of articles are within a newspaper's discretion. 5
The court examined the challenged statements' specificity, verifiability,
and literary and public context, and determined that the statements con-
stituted protected opinion not fact.56 The allegedly false implication was
unspecific and unverifiable.5 7 Therefore, any implication drawn from
such a statement constituted constitutionally protected criticism of a
public official.5"
50. 455 N.W.2d 450 (Minn. 1990).
51. Diesen v. Hessberg, 437 N.W.2d 705 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989).
52. Specifically, the article failed to mention that: 1) Kathy Berglund, the victim, had told the
assailant's probation officer that she believed chemical dependency treatment was more appropriate
for Melvin Defoe, the assailant; 2) Diesen had requested jail time for Defoe; and 3) Berglund admit.
ted she was unable to go through any court process at that point in time. Diesen, 437 N.W.2d at
708.
53. Id. at 710-12.
54. Diesen, 455 N.W.2d at 450.
55. Id. (citing Strada v. Connecticut Newspapers, Inc., 193 Conn. 313, 326, 477 A.2d 1005,
1012 (1984)).
56. Diesen, 455 N.W.2d at 451.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 452.
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The court, however, did not foreclose completely the possibility that
true statements creating a false impression could fulfill the requirement
of falsity. Rather, the court stated that a "false implication arising out of
the statements is generally not actionable in defamation by a public offi-
cial."' 9 The court also was able to reject Diesen's claim on other
grounds: failure to establish actual malice.'
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit took yet
another approach in White v. Fraternal Order of Police.61 In White, the
court separated the issue of defamatory meaning from falsity, stating that
the two are distinct elements of the tort of defamation. The White court
placed Memphis Publishing in the category of cases that defines "false
statement" as opposed to asking the threshold question of whether "this
statement [is] capable of conveying a defamatory meaning."62 However,
the court stated that the Memphis Publishing decision suggests that the
omission of material facts might in some cases supply the missing ingre-
dient to place a literally true communication into the field of implied
defamation. The court never reached this issue. If omissions may be
sufficient to prove defamatory meaning, perhaps satisfaction of the White
standard also satisfies the falsity requirement. No court has addressed
this possibility.
In Newton v. National Broadcasting Co.,63 the Ninth Circuit avoided
the issue of defamation based upon false impression and decided the case
on another ground. In Newton, entertainer Wayne Newton brought a
defamation action against NBC as a result of a three and one-half minute
story, concerning the entertainer's purchase of gambling casino, that
aired on NBC Nightly News."
Newton asserted that the broadcast conveyed the false impression that
mafia and mob sources helped him buy the Aladdin casino in exchange
for a secret share of the purchase.6 5 Newton also claimed that the broad-
cast created the impression that, while under oath, he deceived the Ne-
59. Id. (emphasis added).
60. Id. at 452-54. For cases with similar fact/opinion analysis, see Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d
970, 977-84 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en bane), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127 (1985); Janklow v. Newsweek,
Inc., 788 F.2d 1300, 1302-1305 (8th Cir. 1986), cert denied, 479 U.S. 883 (1986); Information Con-
trol Corp. v. Genesis One Computer Corp., 611 F.2d 781, 783-84 (9th Cir. 1980).
61. 909 F.2d 512 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
62. Id. at 520.
63. 913 F.2d 652 (9th Cir. 1990).
64. Id. at 655.
65. Id.'at 656.
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vada State gaming authorities about his relationship with the mafia.66
The jury found for Newton, and awarded him more than $19 million
in damages. They found that one or more of the broadcasts conveyed a
false and defamatory statement and impression. The jury also found that
the media made the defamatory statements with knowledge of the falsity
or with serious subjective doubts about the statement's truth. Further-
more, the jury determined that the media defendants intended to convey
a false or defamatory impression.67
The Ninth Circuit disposed of the appeal based on Newton's inability
to fulfill the actual malice prong of the Sullivan test. Thus, the Ninth
Circuit did not foreclose the possibility of fulfilling the Sullivan false
statement requirement with juxtaposed true statements that create a false
impression. The court simply failed to reach the issue.68
V. RAMIFICATION OF PUBLIC FIGURE DEFAMATION BASED ON
FALSE IMPRESSIONS
The amorphous and imprecise nature of "impressions" create extreme
difficulties for media defendants to defend against false impression
suits.69 Because a communication's implication varies with the impli-
cator, it is difficult to determine the specific implied meaning.70 Media
defendants rely heavily on first amendment protection to disseminate the
news properly, and fear that a tort based on false impressions will sup-
press information to which the public deserves access.
Conversely, public figures hail the rising trend toward liability
grounded on false impression as a correction in the application of first
amendment protection, which formerly allowed the media only to hint at
wrongdoing.71 Such advocates argue that the media is "manipulating
around" the first amendment. They assert that if the courts prohibit
awards based on false impression, victims of malicious mass media defa-
mation have no available remedy. Without remedy, no deterrence will
66. Id.
67. Newton v. National Broadcasting Co., 677 F. Supp. 1066, 1067 (D. Nev. 1987).
68. Newton, 913 F.2d at 657-58, n.5.
69. False Impression Can Spur Libel Suits, Even if News Media Get the Facts Right, Wall St. J.,
May 15, 1990, at BI, col. 3.
70. Diesen v. Hessburg, 455 N.W.2d 446, 455 n.1. (Minn. 1990). For example, in Diesen, it is
difficult to determine what the implication is. One could state that the articles frame Diesen as an
inept or unfit prosecuter, or a capable prosecutor who lacks the necessary force to prosecute success-
fully certain types of cases. Id.
71. Wall St. J., supra note 69, at BI, col. 3.
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exist to prevent the media from juxtaposing facts and taking statements
out of context. 7
2
Conflict frequently arises when individuals, exercising their right to
speak freely, make false statements injuring the reputation of others.
Courts strive to strike a balance between protecting individual reputa-
tions and promoting freedom of expression. The rigid Sullivan test illus-
trates the Supreme Court's reluctance to diminish first amendment
protection. Its actual malice standard is very difficult for a public figure
plaintiff to satisfy; the Court chose to protect all but the "most malicious
false statements" concerning official conduct.
73
The Sullivan Court's standard of review for public figure defamation
cases74 also illustrates the Court's reluctance to constrict first amend-
ment freedoms. The Court mandated an independent examination of the
whole record to assure the Court that the judgment does not constitute a
forbidden intrusion on the field of free expression.75 The requirement of
independent appellate review reflects the deeply held conviction that
judges must preserve constitutional liberties. 76 The disallowance, by
many jurisdictions, of a public official's offer to prove falsity by implica-
tion when the challenged statements are true,7 7 gives credence to the
strength of first amendment protection.
Courts have not foreclosed the possibility of defamation by implica-
tion; nor do their decisions preclude proof of false impression, rather
than false statements. Elaborate discussions of the importance of first
amendment protection do, however, illustrate judicial reluctance to cut
back this freedom in any significant manner. Courts seem to use the
actual malice prong of the Sullivan test as a crutch to dispose of most
public figure defamation cases.78 Thus, while the media no longer can
rely exclusively on the truth as a complete defense to defamation suits,
they can rest, even if somewhat uneasily, on the plaintiff's difficulty of
proving actual malice with the clear and convincing evidence required to
give rise to public figure defamation.
Kathryn S. Banashek
72. Court Urged to Overturn Libel Award to Singer, L.A. Times, April 14, 1990, at B3, col. 1.
73. Note, supra note 19, at 422.
74. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
75. Id. at 285.
76. Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, 466 U.S. 485, 410-11 (1984).
77. See supra note 1.
78. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
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